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the court in fact upheld the appointment, and this result is in accord
with the views expressed above and the evident tendency of the Ohio
decisions, as well as the actual practice.
EDWIN R. TEPLE.
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM
RIGHT OF SET-OFF BETWEEN BANKER AND DEPOSITOR.
In H. & G. Coleman, Inc., et al. v. Winters National Bank & Tr.
Co., 48 Ohio App. 98, 192 N.E. 478, 16 Abs. 415 (934), the Union
Trust Co. of Dayton under a written contract leased to the defendants
certain offices in the Union Tr. Co. Bldg. for a term of five years com-
mencing May I, 1931. The rent was payable in monthly installments.
The Union Tr. Co. became insolvent, and on October I, 1931, the
Superintendent of Banks took possession of the property and sold and
assigned all right and interests therein to the plaintiff, Winters Bank.
At the time of the insolvency the defendant, Coleman, Inc., had a large
deposit in the bank, which he seeks to set off against the rent which had
accrued from the time that the Superintendent of Banks took charge to
the date of the suit and for which the plaintiff bank here sues. The
court denied the set-off.
The courts have often said that the relationship between the bank
and the depositor is that of debtor and creditor. Shaw v. Bauman, 34
Ohio St. 25 (877), Cincinnati etc. Co. v. Metro p. Nat. Bank, 54
Ohio St. 6o, 42 N.E. 700 (1896); Blake v. Hamilton Dime Sazings
Bank, 79 Ohio St. 189, 2o L.R.A. (N.S.) 290 (19o8) Smith v. Fuller,
86 Ohio St. 57, 99 N.E. 214 (1912); Cleveland Tr. Co. v. Scobie,
114 Ohio St. 241, 48 A.L.R. 182 (1926); Guaranty Tr. Co. v. State,
36 Ohio App. 45, 172 N.E. 674 (1931). And in Ohio the reciprocal
rights of set-off, both legal and equitable, exist between a bank and its
customers, with the same general force and effect as between debtors
and creditors generally. Smith v. Fulton, 31 N.P. (N.S.) 49 (933).
We have a situation for the applicability of legal set-off when a
debtor-creditor relationship exists, and mutual and matured debts exist
as against each other. See Sec. I 1319 and 11321, G.C. It is necessary
that the claims of both parties be matured and that the demands be in
the same right and capacity, or as it is ordinarily expressed, that there be
mutuality of time and parties. Andrews v. State, 124 Ohio St. 348, 178
N.E. 581 (1931); Shoneberg v. Platt, 36 Ohio App. 118, 172 N.E.
685 (1931). Hence, in law, a debt not yet due and payable may not
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be set off against one presently due and payable. Patterson v. Patterson,
59 N.Y. 574, 579, 17 Am. Rep. 384 (875). Nor can one having a
deposit in his own name as executor set off against the claim of the
receiver of an insolvent bank his individual promissory note, because the
executor does not seek the set-off in the same right. A. A. Stasel, Recr.,
etc., v. G. Daugherty, 7. O.N.P. (N.S.), 424, 19 O.D. (N.P.) 720
(19o8). Thus too, a joint debt may not be set off against a separate
debt because of lack of mutuality as to parties. Western Coal Co. v.
Ilollenbeck, 72 Ark. 44, 8o S.W. 145 (1903); Doyle v. Nesting, 37
Co1. 522, 88 Pac. 862 (19o6); Niblack v. Adler, 209 Ill. App. 156
(1917).
It has also been generally held that a borrower from a saving de-
partment of a bank who has a desposit in the commercial or saving
department may not set off either deposit when the bank becomes in-
solvent, where a statute gives the savings depositors a prior lien on all
the assets or where there is some other regulatory statute which the courts
will interpret as intending the assets of the savings department to be a
trust fund for savings depositors. Yardley v. Clothier, 12 C.C.A. 342,
51 F. 5o6 (1896); Lippett, et al. Bk. Commrs., v. Thames Loan &
Tr. Co., 88 Conn. 185, 9 o A. 369 (1914); Basset v. City Bank, 115
Conn. I, I6o A. 6o (1932). The theory of these cases is that to per-
mit a set-off would give a greater share of the assets to the borrowing
than to the non-borrowing depositor; and in the case of insolvency the
savings depositors must share ratably, Lippett, v. Thames, etc., Bank,
supra; Tremont v. Baker, 243 Mass. 530, 137 N.E. 915 (1923);
Bailey v. Comm'r of Banks, 244 Mass. 499, 138 N.E. 915 (1923);
Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Or. 597, 25 A.L.R. 919 (1922); Basset v.
City Bk. & Tr. Co., I15 Conn. i, I6oA. 6o (1932). See 42 Yale
L. J. 143 (1929); Clark Receivers, Vol. 2, P. 1323-4. Those cases
which are contra are distinguished by the courts' different interpretation
of the statute or by the absence of any statute relating to savings deposits.
See Pursiful v. First State Bank, etc., 251 Ky. 498, 65 S.W. (2d) 462
(1933). In the presence of statutory regulation giving savings depositors
a lien on the assets the courts have usually deemed the relationship of
the bank and the depositor as trustee and cestui que trust. Bachrach v.
Allen, 239 Mass. 272 (1921). See also 5 0. Jur. Sec. 194. In the
absence of such statutory regulation; however, the courts have generally
considered the relationship that of debtor and creditor. Pursiful v. First
State Bk., supa. Lack of mutuality of parties does not prevent a de-
positor from setting off a loan from the commercial department against
a deposit in either the commercial or savings department. Lippett v.
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Thames, etc., supra; cf. Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Or. 597, 2o9 Pac.
100 (1922). But when the loan has been transferred to the savings
department for value no right of set-off exists. Cosmopolitan Tr. Co. v.
Rosenbush, 239 Mass. 305, I3 N.E. 858 (1921); Bieringer-Hanauer
Co. v. Cosmopolitan Tr. Go., 247 Mass. 73, 141 N.E. 566 (1923);
Bachrach v. 1llen, supra; see 81 A.L.R. 15o8 for a review of the
cases. In regard to set-off in a building and loan association, a recent
Ohio Statute, G.C. 9652-1, permits a set-off of 5o% of the debt by
certificates of deposit, and the time of the acquisition of these certificates
is immaterial. On this subject, see 5o A.L.R. 526 (1927). In connec-
tion with the right of a surety to set off deposits in an insolvent bank,
See 41 Yale Law J. 881 (1932) and 40 A.L.R. 1896.
Granted the mutuality of parties, the following factual situations
raise important problems analogous to those raised in the principal case:
i. Where a bank seeks to offset a debtor's deposit against an insol-
vent depositor's matured debt to the bank. It has been held in Ohio and
in most jurisdictions that a bank has a general lien in the nature of a
set-off on the deposits in its possession. Bank of Marysville v. W. M.
Brewing Co., 50 Ohio St. 151, 33 N.E. 1054 (893); Hakman v.
Schoof, 8 O.D. Rep. 127 (1898); German Amer. Say. Bk. v. Gross-
man, 15 O.C.C. 378, 8 O.C.D. 682 (1897). See also State, etc. v. Ful-
ton, 128 Ohio St. 192, 19o N.E. 383 (1934); Docking v. Commercial
Nat. Bank, 118 Kan. 566, 235 Pac. 1044 (1925). This lien must
arise from deposits of money or funds belonging to the depositor himself.
McMillan v. Boyd, 40 Ohio St. 35 (1883)-
2. Where a bank seeks to offset the insolvent customer's deposit
against his unmatured debt. The general rule is that for a bank to apply
a deposit to a debt of a solvent deopsitor, the debt must be due and
payable. But where a depositor is insolvent, the majority of courts will
permit a bank, by way of equitable set-off, to apply the deposit to the
payment of an unmatured note. 5 0. Jur. Banks and Banking, Sec. 139,
Grimm v. Columbus Say. Bank, 25 O.N.P. (N.S.) 203 (1924); Mar-
tin v. Kunz-Miller, 37 N.Y. 398 (1867); Fera v. Wickham, 135 N.Y.
223, 17 L.R.A. 456, 31 N.E. 1028 (1892). See Clark, Set Off in
Caseq of Immature Claims, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 178 (192o) notes, 76
U. of P. L. Rev. IOI (1927-28); 37 W. Va. L.Q. 3o 4 (1930-); 43
A.L.R. 1325.
3. Where the depositor is indebted to an insolvent bank and seeks
to offset his deposit against his mature debt. There is no question but
that this many be done today in either law or equity. State v. Alward,
44 Ohio App. 281, 185 N.E. 56o (1933); Coburn v. Carstarphen,
70 LAW JOURNAL- DECEMBER, 1935
194 N.C. 368, 139 S.E. 596 (1927); In re Merchant's Bank, 204
N.C. 472, 168 S.E. 676 (1927); Barrington v. Miner, 24 F. 2d 917
(1932). See 81 A.L.R. 665. The theory in permitting set-offs in this
situation is that the assignor or receiver stands in the same position as the
insolvent bank, and so takes subject to set-off. People v. Calif., etc., Co.,
168 Cal. 211, 141 P. 1181 (1914). While a set-off is permitted, it
must be remembered that this right against the receiver is governed by
the condition existing at the time the receiver is appointed; and the claims
assigned to the debtor thereafter may not be set off even though mature.
Williams v. Williams, 192 N.C. 405, 135 S.E. 39 (1926); U. S. Fi-
delity & Guar Co. v. Maxwell, 152 Ark. 64, 237 S.W. 708 (1922).
The objection to assignments acquired after insolvency is that there is
no mutuality of parties and that a preference accrues to the general
creditor for the one who demands the set-off.
In .tensch v. Metropolitan Savings & Loan Co., 50 Ohio App. 25,
OHIo BAR (Sept. 16, 1935), decided since the principal case, the de-
positors were indebted to the bank on a note secured by a mortgage, the
obligation being due and payable. The bank was not under obligation to
pay the deposit presently by reason of its regulations restricting pay-
ment, to which the depositors had consented. The court held that the
savings depositors could compel the bank to set off their account against
their indebtedness, although the payment of the account had been post-
poned so that no independent action at law could be brought to recover
said account.
4. Where a depositor is indebted to an insolvent bank and seeks to
offset his deposit against his unmatured debt. While in this situation a
set-off in law is not permitted, Coffin v. McLean, 8o N.Y. 563
(189i); Bank v. Hemingray, 34 Ohio St. 381 (1878), in equity,
when justice requires it, the set-off will generally be allowed. The
weight of authority in America is to allow the set-off in this situation
although there is no strict mutuality. Andrew v. Dundee Say. Bank,
216 Iowa 240, 249 N.W. 154 (933); Cooper v. Fidelity Tr. Co.,
17o A. 726 (Me., 1934) ; Merchants Ice Co. v. Holland Banking Co.,
223 Mo. App. 93, 8 S.W. (2d) 1030 (1928). The doctrine upon
which these cases are based, termed the "waiver theory," is that a de-
positor if he chooses may expedite payment of a debt due from himself,
for in so doing, he is merely waiving the provision of a credit period
which is in his favor. Clute v. Warner, 8 App. Div. 40, 4o N.Y.S. 392
(1896); Nashville Tr. Co. v. Bank, 91 Tenn. 336, 18 S.W. 822
(1892); and 8o U. of Pa. L.Rev. 420, 421 (193). See The Cur-
rent Account and Set-offs Between an Insolvent Bank and Its Cus-
tomers, 41 Yale L. J. iO9 (1932).
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The principal case may well be considered under the fourth category
above. A claim to set off rent accruing after a receiver is appointed
involves not only an unmatured debt but one which is strictly not even
an inchoate or a contingent one. The better authorities will not allow
the set-off. The principal case relied upon Butler v. Tuncliffe, 104 Fla.
477, 140 So. 201 (i932), and Wasson v. White, Ia F. (2d) 809
(925). In both of these cases the operative facts were like those in
the principal case, and in both cases the ground for denial was that the
right of set-off against a receiver is to be governed by the state of affairs
existing at the time of the insolvency and not by the conditions created
afterwards; that the total rent stipulated in the contract is not such a
present debt that it may be set off; and that a set-off in this situation
would in effect be a preference. See Maxcy v. City of Washburn, 196
Wis. 566, 218 N.W. 825 (1928). The Iowa courts, on the other
hand, allow a set-off of rent which accrues after the appointment of a
receiver. In Patch v. Boyle, 197 Iowa 1314, 197 N.W. 35 (1924)
under circumstances similar to those in the principal case, the court held
that the rent on the lease was an existing debt but only "time is wanting
to render it due." For a review of the cases on set-off of rents accruing
after the appointment of a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy, see 71
A.L.R. 117.
When we recognize the distinction between unmatured rent not
yet due and an unmatured note, the principal case seems clearly based
on the better reasoning. The distinction is found well stated in Bank of
Baltimore v. Page, 164 Md. 500, 503, I65 A. 701, 702 (1933): "The
principle which applies in the case of a note does not apply in the case of
unmatured rent. The note is owed immediately, but the rent is not a
debt until it becomes due." Although in Funk & Son v. Young, 138
Ark. 38, 44, 210 S.W. 143, 144 (1919), the court said that "the
trend of modern decisions is toward liberality in the allowance of set-off
in the case of insolvency against whom the set-off is claimed." Yet
apparently the courts are not willing to go so far as to sanction the
set-off of rent which accrues after the appointment of a receiver.
B. BERNARD WOLSON.
